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Ever since Nicolai Gogol wrote The Overcoat, in 1841,1 if not
before, people have been aware that bureaucratic government,
regularly, if not inevitably, generates a unique form of oppression.
But what precisely is the nature of that oppression? After all, prebureaucratic government cannot be described as unfailingly kind to
ordinary people. There is apparently something about administrative
government that breeds a form of oppression that prior governments
were unable to discover, but that we perceive as a ubiquitous,
virtually inherent aspect of the government we currently possess. But
if this form of oppression is so widespread, and so intrinsic, what are
the chances that we would ever be able to eliminate it?
This article is an attempt to discern the sources of bureaucratic
oppression and suggest some procedural mechanisms that might
ameliorate the problem. It focuses specifically on the quotidian
oppression to which ordinary individuals are subject in their dealings
with the modern administrative state.2 Part I discusses the sources of
bureaucratic oppression, noting that these sources are built into the
structure of administrative agencies. Part II then identifies and
analyzes three proposed solutions that collectively reflect a wide
variety of academic disciplines. The first is the imposition of due
process requirements, which is based largely on legal analysis. The
second is a shift to client-centered management, which draws on
management theory and the sociology of institutions. The third is
reliance upon market or quasi-market mechanisms, based on insights
drawn from microeconomics. All these approaches suffer from
serious limitations, however, particularly because the sources of
bureaucratic oppression are so structural in nature. In response, Part
III suggests an alternative approach, drawn from phenomenology,
psychology and organization theory. Its goal is to alter bureaucratic
attitudes by making the agency=s clients directly and specifically
dangerous to its employees.
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I. The Sources of Bureaucratic Oppression
The climactic scene of Gogol=s Overcoat occurs after the theft
of Akaky Akakyevich=s newly-made overcoat, on which he had
lavished his life savings. Akaky, a timid, impecunious government
clerk, is advised that if he goes to the police, he will never get his
overcoat back because he will be unable to prove that it is his.
Instead, he should apply to a higher official, a Very Important Person,
who can intercede on his behalf. This Very Important Person,
however, has received a visit from a childhood friend, whom he
wants to impress, when Akaky appears. After making Akaky wait
outside his office for an inordinate length of time, he allows him to
come in and state his request. A>What do you mean, sir?=@ he thunders
to Akaky. A>Don=t you know the proper procedure? What have you
come to me for? Don=t you know how things are done? In the first
place you should have sent a petition about it to my office. Your
petition, sir, would have been placed before the chief clerk, who
would have transferred it to my secretary, and my secretary would
have submitted it to me . . .=@ 3 Further admonitions of this kind
reduce Akaky to a state of nervous collapse; he is carried out of the
office, succumbs to a fever, and dies.
We are all familiar with the same phenomenon in less
melodramatic form. There we stand, on the linoleum floor of a
shoddy-looking office, underneath florescent lights suspended from
the acoustical tiles on the ceiling. After a half-hour wait, we find
ourselves standing across the metal counter from a bored, surly
government clerk, who informs us that we have been standing on the
wrong line, and that we must go to the back of another equally long,
equally slow-moving line. >No,@ we are told, it can=t be helped.
AEvery one has to follow the same rules. There=s nothing I can do
about it.@ 4 The experience is disconcerting in itself, and perhaps
particularly disconcerting in a consumer-oriented society where other
institutions that deal with individuals, most particularly private firms,
strive to provide friendly, cheerful service.5
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These two incidents, whose consequences range from the
tragic to the irritating, reflect several of the basic elements of
bureaucratic oppression: status differences, stranger relations,
institutional pathologies, and divergent incentives. For purposes of
the following discussion, bureaucratic oppression can be defined as
action by particular administrative agents that imposes unnecessary
and harmful burdens on private parties. This definition refers to a
broad range of behaviors; for example, it is not limited to illegal
action.6 It certainly includes an unjustified fine, or a burdensome
inspection that violates the agency=s own protocols. 7 But it also
includes dogged insistence on following the rules when doing so
imposes burdens for no purpose, like forcing people to stand in
multiple, ambiguously labeled lines, or imposition of formal rules in
an excessively abusive and punitive manner, as in Gogol=s Overcoat.
The definition, however, excludes enactment of a rule, not
because rules cannot be oppressive in some ordinary language sense,
but because whatever harms rules impose are distinguishable form the
harms imposed by individual government agents. Rules are relatively
high-profile administrative actions, affecting groups of people, and
groups have political means of protecting themselves. A related
exclusion is the sense of oppression, again in the ordinary language
sense, that results from correct application of a rule, without any other
abusive action. Regulatory states necessarily impose burdens on
various actors, or deny desired benefits to them, but this by itself
With a Smile: Understanding the Consequence of Emotional Labor, in Cameron
Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Service Society and the Changing Experience
of Work, in Cameron Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, eds., Working in the Service
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cannot be regarded as a problem that needs to be solved. Within its
defined category of governmental action, the article is further limited
to the bureaucratic oppression of individuals, and does not consider
oppression of business firms or other organizations. The reason for
this further limitation is simply that the two cases are distinguishable,
and that either one is a sufficiently large topic for a single article.
Oppression of individuals has been selected because it seems more
serious, and because it is more easily described. It is an important
enough problem to justify imposition of the proposed solution;
whether oppression of firms should be addressed at all, and whether
the same mechanism could be used for doing so, is a matter that is left
for consideration at another time.

A. Status Differences
Government officials have generally occupied high status
positions in most societies throughout the course of history. During
the early feudal era in the Western world, the social and governmental
hierarchy were virtually identical.
The king was the head of
government precisely because he had the highest social status, that is,
he was the feudal overlord of the nobility.8 The social status of the
nobility, in turn, was defined by their position as feudal lords, and this
position simultaneously made each of them the official ruler of a
territory, or honor, and all who lived within it. 9 With the growth of
royal government in the High Middle Ages, Renaissance and
Reformation periods, a class of officials who were separate from the
8
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landed nobility began to emerge, but these officials often had noble
backgrounds,10 and in any case they quickly acquired a high status of
their own, which was often formalized by grants of land and titles.11
The French practice of selling governmental offices had the natural
effect of transforming appointed officials into a hereditary nobility.12
With the advent of the administrative state and the rapid
development of industrial wealth in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, a much more definitive separation between
status and official position occurred. According to Weber=s classic
definition, bureaucratic government is characterized by full-time
employees who are compensated by regular salaries, rather than by
the fees they collect.13 All but the most high-ranking employees are
selected on the basis of merit, thus precluding selection based directly
on status. Conversely, industrialization shifted the primacy locus of
wealth, and ultimately status, away from the landed nobility who
exercised governmental or quasi-governmental authority over defined
territories, and to a group of persons who, while perfectly content to
influence the government in their favor, defined themselves as private
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persons.14 These developments, combined with the massive growth of
government in the administrative era, produced a group of official
functionaries with relatively low social status.
But the precise social status of administrators, and the
consequences of that status, are complex.15 Regulatory officials, who
often deal with corporate executives, land owners, of professionals,
are in a socially ambiguous position. On the one hand, many of those
they regulate, particularly corporate executives, possess higher social
status; on the other hand, their authority, their ability to impose
sanctions, enhances their status beyond that which their title or salary
might suggest. Officials who provide benefits or services, such as
welfare workers, social security administrators, teachers, doctors,
nurses, and police are located somewhere in the middle of the social
hierarchy. In an upper middle class suburb, teachers and police are
socially subordinate to those they serve, although they also benefit
from the authority of their position, and in many cases, from their
professional status. In an impoverished area, whether urban or rural,
they are clearly superior. 16 Officials who deal with the poor because
of the intrinsic nature of the task, such as welfare workers, are
unambiguously superior because they themselves have higher status,
14
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and because their clients are automatically placed in a socially
subordinate position by the benefits being provided to them.
In short, public officials in the modern administrative state are
not automatically superior to those they govern, in the manner of
feudal lords or Gogol=s Very Important Person, but they are often
superior in particular situations. Wherever such superiority occurs, it
carries with it substantial opportunities for oppression. This
oppression consists of scorn, peremptory treatment, a failure to
empathize with the person involved and most seriously, unwillingness
to perform the assigned task of benefit distribution, education or
protection. It can be obvious and open, 17 or it can be rather subtle, 18
but it is always hurtful, and often harmful to both the individual and
the social interest that the relevant legislation was designed to foster.
In his study of the Social Security Administration, Jerry
Mashaw observed that retired people were generally treated
respectfully and conscientiously.19 This is consistent with the idea
that status differences are partially responsible for bureaucratic
oppression. While poor people, unemployed people, orphans, and
other recipients of government benefits are generally low status
persons B that is, lower than public officials B social security
recipients are not. Everyone grows old, including the wealthy, the
well-connected and the skillfully vociferous. Moreover, social
security is not regarded as welfare, but as a return on payments made
by working people, which is exactly what President Roosevelt
intended when he crafted the program.20 These features confer status
17
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on social security recipients, and thus serve to secure respectful
behavior by the agency.
B. Stranger Relations
A closely related problem is that the individual with whom a
government official is dealing in the modern administrative state is
likely to be a stranger. In the pre-administrative era, the inherent
oppressiveness of the status differences between rulers and their
subject was ameliorated by the highly localized nature of social
control. These interactions and, indeed, virtually all interactions,
occurred within the confines of a village or a manor, where the people
who were being ruled most likely spent their entire lives. The lord,
or, more often, the lord=s seneschal or bailiff, was likely to know
every person whom he commanded or who applied to him for
assistance on a personal basis, as was the parish priest who
administered aid and provided education.
While ingrown
relationships of this sort can certainly lead to antipathy and
resentment, there is also a human level of familiarity, and at least the
potential for empathetic concern. In any event, members of the local
elite were likely to understand the needs of the lower-status people in
their village or manor, since the two groups had spent their entire
lives together. Moreover, there was no need for the elite to use
oppression to assert their social superiority, as do Gogol=s Very
Important Person and the surly clerk behind the metal counter. The
status hierarchy in pre-modern localities was well established and
well understood by all concerned.
In modern mass society, government officials who deal with
ordinary citizens are almost invariably dealing with strangers. A
regulatory official may come to know the executives and attorneys in
the firm she regulates, and she may even develop friendly relations
with them, particularly if she intends to seek a job at that firm when
she leaves the government. But benefits workers, social security
administrators, police officers, and medical personnel are typically
dealing with large numbers of individuals whom they are unlikely to
see again, and even more unlikely to have known before. The
numbers of people they must regularly deal with not only render each
individual anonymous to them, but also create a sense of being
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.@ Schlesinger,
supra, at 308-09.
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overwhelmed by work that cautions them against making any effort to
reduce this anonymity; to begin giving people individualized attention
would quickly make the job impossible to perform.21
There is, moreover, a proliferation of functions in the modern
state that result from the need to manage mass society, and thus have
no pre-modern analogue. Modern people need to obtain driver=s
licenses, passports, zoning variances, change of address forms, and a
variety of other authorizations, each of which requires interaction
with the government bureaucracy. In all these relationships, there is
no familiarity between the parties, little chance for empathy, and a
basic uncertainty that the government official will even understand
the real needs of the individual in front of them.22 Barbara Gutek=s
leading study of customer relations in business firms concluded that
most interactions with customers took the form of encounters, rather
than relationships, that is, superficial, instrumentally-oriented
interchanges that precluded any real human contact. 23 Interactions
between government employees and citizens would appear to display
similar characteristics.
It is important, of course, not to romanticize pre-modern
times. Familiarity was no guarantee against harsh treatment by one=s
superiors, and life in a small, insulated town could be stultifying and
oppressive in its totality. Cities were generally regarded as places of
freedom and opportunity during the medieval, Renaissance and
Reformation periods,24 the famous slogan being that Acity air makes
one free.@ By the eighteenth century, these cities had become large
enough to offer their residents a certain anonymity, and this too
provided an escape from the oppressiveness of ingrown, pre-modern
societies. But the freedom and anonymity that modern urban settings
offer has never be regarded as including the freedom to receive harsh
21
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treatment from the bureaucracy. Indeed, administrative government
can be seen as an effort to reassert control over people in the more
fluid, otherwise unsupervised circumstances of modern life. The
point, then, is that familiarity and affective bonds of pre-modern
society were not available as a palliative against this new form of
control. The freedom that the social circumstances of modernity had
conferred on people could be undermined or extirpated by
bureaucratic supervision, and the anonymity which had been a
component of that freedom now left people alone and unprotected
when this supervision turned abusive.

C. Institutional Pathologies
A medieval lord owed certain obligations to his feudal
superior, but in his treatment of the ordinary people on his property he
was essentially unsupervised, while his seneschal or bailiff were
answerable only to him. The parish priest was part of a large,
hierarchically organized institution, but he was also largely
unsupervised in his quotidian interaction with his parishioners. 25
Modern administrative agents, however, are part of large, complex
institutions, and these institutions often malfunction in a way that
produces further forms of oppression. Organization theory has amply
documented a wide variety of such malfunctions.26 For example, the
difficulty of managing a large institution, and specifying performance
standards to control the action of their hundreds, thousands or tens of
thousands of employees often lead them to establish goals whose
25
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natural consequence is to harm the people that they are supposed to
help. Welfare and social security workers are often rewarded for
minimizing the benefits that they provide, thus saving their
department money, rather than for making sure that every eligible
recipient receives the intended benefit; police officers are rewarded
for making arrests and obtaining confessions, rather than for reducing
crime; doctors and nurses at public hospitals may be encouraged to
treat people quickly and discharge them, or to discourage them from
using the hospital at all, rather than making a thorough assessment of
their medical condition.27
Perhaps the best-known institutional pathology of
governmental agencies is excessive formalism, popularly known as
Ared tape.@28 The Very Important Person=s insistence that Akaky file a
petition which would be submitted to Athe chief clerk, who would
have transferred it to my secretary, and my secretary would have
submitted it to me@ is an immediately recognizable example. The
term, however vivid, is not really self-explanatory. It is obviously a
metaphor, derived from the time when actual red tape was used to tie
up batches of U.S. Federal Court documents. 29 One definition runs
as follows: ARed tape refers to government measures that impede job
creation and investment opportunities and diminish competitiveness
by adding unnecessary, uncoordinated or unjustifiable requirements,
restrictions, compliance, implementation or administrative costs to
everyday business activities.@ 30 This definition itself verges on red
tape by committing the closely-allied sin of being written in
bureaucratize; in fact,
27
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it comes from a government agency, the Province of Ontario=s Red
Tape Secretariat. Its origin generates a disquieting impression that
government cannot try to eliminate Ared tape@ without simultaneously
succumbing to it.
This may well be true; Weber=s classic definition of
bureaucracy states: AThe authority to give commands required for the
discharge of [official] duties is distributed in a stable way,@31 and AThe
management of the modern office is based upon written documents
(>the files=), which are preserved in their original or draft form, and
upon a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts.@32 Insistence
that people follow prescribed, written rules, and interact with
prescribed, hierarchically subordinate officials, may be intrinsic to the
structure of modern administrative government. If so, the crucial
word in the Ontario definition, and virtually any other definition of
red tape, is Aunnecessary.@ The inevitable rules and restrictions of
bureaucracy have an oppressive character, but unnecessary rules and
restrictions are truly oppressive precisely because they are additional
burdens imposed on citizens for no good reason. Distinguishing the
necessary from the unnecessary, however, is likely to be a difficult
task. If one opens the typically thick Office Manual or Employees=
Manual of a governmental agency, one is unlikely to find a statement
that the any particular requirement is unnecessary.
D. Divergent Incentives
Divergent incentives are perhaps the most familiar source of
bureaucratic oppression because they are part of public choice
analysis, or, more generally, of the microeconomic methodology that
views human behavior as an effort by individual actors to maximize
their personal self-interest.33 Public choice analysis argues that this
31
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predilection will lead government officials to be concerned with
achieving advantages for themselves, rather than fulfilling their
obligation to serve the needs of the supposed beneficiaries. The
oppression that is likely to result from such divergent incentives is
apparent. What is not so obvious, however, is the nature of the
interest that these officials are trying to maximize. Public choice
theory has had considerable success in modeling legislators as reelection maximizers, but it has stumbled badly in its effort to identify
the equivalent maximizing behavior for administrative agents.
William Niskanen=s idea that they are trying to maximize their
agency=s budget 34 has proven to be empirically untenable,35 while
subsequent claims that they are trying to maximize their Aslack,@ or
discretion,36 are only rescued from similar empirical falsification by
their pervasive ambiguity. A much more convincing hypothesis, but
one that eludes public choice analysis, is that many government
agents are not trying to maximize anything, but rather trying to
minimize work or hassle.37 That is certainly the impression conveyed
by the clerk behind the metal counter.
The problem of divergent incentives, however, goes well
beyond public choice analysis, or even the related hypothesis of
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hassle minimizing, and links directly to the problem of institutional
pathologies. As Charles Schultze and James Q. Wilson point out,
government agents do not derive any direct benefit from providing
effective or gracious service.38 They work in institutions, and
institutions exercise powerful effects over their members. The formal
rules and informal norms of their agency, the dense web of written
requirements, institutional practice, supervision and peer relations, are
almost invariably the primary determinants of their behavior. One
specific manifestation of such institutional effects that runs directly
counter to humane, effective service is group solidarity. People=s
instinctive sociability leads government officials to establish
congenial, and in some cases truly friendly relations with their
colleagues; they interact throughout the day, have lunch together,
perhaps even socialize after work. The citizens they serve, on the
other hand, are strangers, as described above, and often unwelcome
intrusions.
There are, undoubtedly, various other sources of bureaucratic
oppression.39 One explanation that should be discounted, however, is
Theodore Lowi=s claim that oppression results from an excessive
grant of discretion to administrative agents.40 Discretion is an almost
uselessly vague term, but to the extent that it can be defined, 41 it

38

Charles Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest 66-83 (1977); Wilson,
supra note [ ], at 113-36.

39

Several commentators have observed that the excessively adversarial stance that
U.S. agencies adopt toward those whom they regulate or serve is another
institutional pathology that contributes to oppressive administrative behavior. See
Derek Bok, The Trouble With Government 163-68 (2001); Robert Kagan,
Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2001).
40

Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United

States 92-126 (2nd ed. 1979). See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 259 (1994); David Schoenbrod, Power
Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation
(1993).
41

In the section of his book entitled ADelegation Defined,@ for example, Lowi never
offer a definition. See Lowi, supra note [ ], at 95-97. For what is probably the
leading effort to define the term, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 3132 (1978). Dworkin=s approach is related to the legal process approach of Hart and

15

probably does not exist in the administrative state. Virtually all
administrative agents have some set of goals, whether effective or
ineffective, client-centered or institution-centered, that they are
expected to achieve by their hierarchical superiors. Their actions, as
noted above, are governed by a dense framework of institutional
expectations and understandings. 42 To be sure, this framework may
allow, or require that the agent make choices, but those choices are
constrained by a variety of factors whose cumulative effect will be to
eliminate the sense of freedom that the term discretion tends to imply.
Bureaucratic oppression, particularly as experienced by individuals,43
is more likely to result from the government agent=s scrupulous,
perhaps mindless obedience to the applicable rules than from
disobedience of those rules and the indulgence of caprice.
II. What is to Be Done? 44
Bureaucratic oppression is hardly an obscure phenomenon;
not only is it apparent to any conscientious observer, but, unlike
other problems such as malnourishment or inadequate health care,
every person who chooses to consider the subject is likely to have
experienced it personally. The causes of bureaucratic oppression,
however, are so closely related to the inherent structure of modern
government and modern society that the difficulty of finding a
solution has been equally apparent. While this sometimes induces a
Sachs, see Vincent Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The
Legacy of Hart and Sachs, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 413 (1987).
42
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Organizational Perspective, in id. at 163; Keith Hawkins, On Legal DecisionMaking, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1161 (1986); Edward Rubin, Discretion and Its
Discontents, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1299 (1997)
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Lowi=s sympathies are expressed exclusively for businesses. Lowi, supra note
[ ], at 108-113
44

The reference to V.I. Lenin, What is to Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our
Moment (1929) is only partially facetious. Trotsky thought that bureaucracy was
responsible for the demise of genuine Communism, see Leon Trotsky, The
Revolution Betrayed: What Is The Soviet Union and Where Is It Going? (Max
Eastman, trans., 1937).
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sense of fatalism, it has also elicited thoughtful proposals for
fundamental change in governmental operations from a variety of
academic disciplines. Legal scholars have proposed the imposition of
due process standards on government agencies, organization theorists
in sociology and public policy have proposed client-centered
management, and economists have proposed reliance on market
incentives. Moreover, these proposals are not merely academic; each
has been implemented by political actors to significant extent. This
section will consider them in turn.
A. Due Process: The Legal Solution
The rationale for using due process to combat bureaucratic
oppression is a powerful one, and the way the concept was applied in
practice was creative and sophisticated. Originally, due process
involved a set of rules governing the conduct of a civil or criminal
trial. The significance of these rules is that trials were essentially the
only legal means by which the pre-modern state interacted with
individuals. Of course, the state also affected people by enacting
legislation, but legislation is generally directed against large groups,
which can protect themselves through the political process. A group
may lose out, of course; legislation may favor dairy farmers over
vegetable oil producers, or optometrists over opticians,45 but that is the
nature of the political process. During the Progressive Era, a
conservative Supreme Court thought it could use the due process
clause to protect groups from legislation that disfavored them without
good reason,46 but the resulting doctrine, termed substantive due
process, proved untenable, and was ultimately abandoned by the
Court. 47 The rationale for legislation cannot be effectively policed by
45

See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). For an account of the politics that
accompany such legislation, see Geoffrey Miller, The True Story of Carolene
Products, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 397.
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courts; virtually all legislation favors some group over another, and
our system of majoritarian decision making allows government to
make these choices, subject only to the constraint of politics in most
situations.48
Individuals, however, rarely have access to the political
process, and thus cannot look to this means of protecting their
interests. Conversely, there is no need to allow the government to
choose among individual interests to preserve the process of
majoritarian decision making. Thus, when the government acts
against individuals, additional constraints can and should be imposed
to protect the interests of individuals and ensure that the government
is acting fairly. This result is achieved by two principles, codified in
the U.S. Constitution as the bill of attainder clause and the due
process clause.49 The bill of attainder clause forbids Congress from
passing legislation that imposes disadvantages on individuals.50 Thus,
government may only disadvantage individuals by applying general
laws to them, laws which are the product of the political process
Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence
(1993); Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1992).
48
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This is the import of the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152n.4 (1938). See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985); Jack Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 275 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the AInsiderOutsider,@ U. Penn. L. Rev. 1291 (1986); John Ely, Democracy and Distrust
(1980). In recent years, the Court has also imposed constraints on federal
legislation to protect the rights of states, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), but there are strong
arguments against this, see Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
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Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985); Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the
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where they will have obtained whatever protection their group can
provide.
The due process clause then imposes constraints of the way the
government applies the law. The purpose of these constraints, in
essence, is to ensure that the disadvantages being imposed on an
individual are authorized by a general law, where group protection is
available.
Since the only mechanism that available to the state for
applying legislation to individuals in the pre-administrative era were
the courts, due process protections developed as a set of rules involve
court proceedings, whether criminal or civil. With the advent of the
administrative state, however, agencies became the primary means for
implementing legislation, and thus the primary means by which the
state interacted with individuals. The problem was that there was
initially no established means of applying the due process clause to
these non-judicial situations; thus, the first instinct was to declare that
the clause did not apply at all, that administratively-implemented
benefits were privileges, not rights. 51 This position was originally a
product of the substantive due process era, when the misplaced
empathy for property owners that led the courts to police general
legislation was matched by a corresponding lack of empathy for wage
earners and poor persons who depended on benefits created by the
legislature and enforced by agencies. Because the concept of due
process was tied, conceptually, to judicial trials, however, the rightsprivileges distinction persisted for thirty years after the demise of
substantive due process. 52 This suggests that the difficulty in
applying due process protection to administrative action was
conceptual, not political.
The conceptual difficulty was finally solved by abstracting the
elements of due process from their civil trial context, so that they
could be applied in a broader range of settings, and specifically to the
now-ubiquitous interactions between administrative agencies and
individuals. The case that began this development is probably
51

McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Judge Oliver
Wendell Holmes). See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
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See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Nelson v. County of Los
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Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 53 but the crucial decision is in
the 1970 case of Goldberg v. Kelly. 54 Goldberg=s abolition of the
right-privilege distinction was stated in an almost off-hand manner.55
The real work in the decision is the effort to identify the generalized
elements of due process protection. According to the decision, these
are notice of the matter at stake, an oral or written hearing where each
side is able to state its case,56 a neutral decision maker, and a decision
based on the evidence and arguments presented.57 Having
characterized the essence of due process in this manner, the Court
was able to apply it, in a series of subsequent cases, to a wide variety
of administrative settings. In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court held
that only written submissions were necessary in social security
hearings; 58 in Vitek v. Jones, 59 it fashioned a quasi-adversarial
proceeding to determine whether prisoners could be transferred to a
mental institution, and, most dramatically, in Goss v. Lopez, 60 it
53

339 U.S. 306 (1950). New York law provided that notice to beneficiaries of a
common trust fund that the fund was being termination should be provided by
newspaper publication. Justice Jackson argued that the due process clause required
more specific notice in cases where the beneficiaries were known to the trustee.
He did so by detaching the concept of notice from the indictment or complaint of
traditional trials, and then applying this generalized concept to the specific situation
in the case.
54
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397 U.S. 254 (1970)
Id. at 262
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Id. at 267-71 The only matter that was truly at issue was whether a written
hearing would be sufficient. The Court required an oral hearing in the specific
context of welfare termination, but implied that written hearings could be
acceptable in other situations.
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Id. at 271
424 U.S. 319 (1976)
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reduced the requirements to a minimum in order to apply them to
week-long suspensions from public school.
The Supreme Court=s impressive conceptual success in
generalizing due process protection for individuals so that it could be
applied to administrative interactions was ramified by scholarly
discussion. The idea that trials in the pre-modern world, and
administative due process in the contemporary one, protects
individuals by requiring government to demonstrate that they belong
within a category created by majoritarian legislation focuses on the
role of due process in ensuring the accuracy of the state=s
determination. Jerry Mashaw and Frank Michelman pointed out that
due process also serves a dignitary or fraternal function by giving
individuals a voice and requiring the government to respond seriously
to their challenges or allegations.61 Tom Tyler then discovered,
through empirical investigation, that government=s compliance with
due process requirements lends moral authority to its determinations,
and reconciles people to adverse decisions.62 He further found that the
underlying reason for this effect is not only the perceived fairness of
the due process-bound determination, but also the dignitary or
fraternal effects the Mashaw and Michelson discerned. Through their
scholarship, these writers, and others, advanced the incisive point that
administrative due process, in applying an abstracted, generalized
version of the trial model, must incorporate the symbolic and
dramturgical features of trials along with their fairness in determining
the facts.
Despite its grounding in our basic theory of government, and
the sophistication with which it has been developed by both judges
and scholars, generalized due process is seriously limited as a means
of controlling bureaucratic oppression. To begin with, it is limited to
interactions between individuals and government that fall into the
category of adjudications, that is, a final determination about whether
to impose some disadvantage, or deny some advantage, to an
61
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individual. But most of the interactions that give rise to bureaucratic
oppression lie well outside this category. Gogol=s Very Important
Person is not making a determination at all, but only demanding,
however harshly, that Akaky follow established procedures;
similarly, the crabby official behind the metal counter is simply
informing the hapless applicants that they have chosen the wrong line.
Much oppression resides in the informal, quotidian contacts between
individuals and government officials. Both due process decisions and
due process scholarship emerge from the discipline of law, and suffer
from that discipline=s disproportionate emphasis on adjudicatory
action. The field simply fails to provide an adequate conceptual
framework for addressing non-adjudicatory interactions.
Even within the ambit of adjudication where legal analysis
prevails, due process requirements do not necessarily provide a
solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression. The pursuit of an
adjudicatory remedy requires a certain rights-orientation, an
optimistic confidence in one=s own position and abilities, that is often
precisely what is lacking in recipients of government assistance. To
say that people who are capable of obtaining benefits by pursuing an
adjudication are probably those who do not require benefits in the
first place would be going to far. But clearly, many people who
receive benefits or services from government B the disabled, the sick,
the elderly, the young, the very young, the mentally deficient and
deranged B are precisely those whose vulnerabilities preclude
assertion of their rights. Like consumers generally, the are more
likely to Alump it@ then to enter the foreign, and seemingly perilous
territory of legal action. Lawyers or other professional representatives
can supply the required sense of confidence and outrage, but they are
formidably expensive, and often just as foreign and frightening as the
legal system, to which they unmistakably belong. Legal services
lawyers are an exception on both counts, but they are in increasingly
short supply, perhaps, if one wants to be cynical, for that very reason.
There is, moreover, some question whether due process
requirements really serve to decrease bureaucratic oppression, even
when the aggrieved individual can obtain legal representation, or
when the adjudication is so informal that most people can assert their
claims on their own, as in the case of school suspension hearings.63
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The image of a hearing that ensures an accurate application of the
law=s general categories to individuals, or, better still, that conveys a
sense of fairness and respect, is an appealing one, and not without
factual foundation. There is, however, the countervailing image
conjured up by Malcolm Feeley=s study of the New Haven criminal
courts, which is tellingly entitled The Process is the Punishment. 64
Legal procedures can be an instrument of oppression, rather than an
antidote to such oppression; they can immerse the average person in a
foreign world where strange, barely-comprehended rituals that lead to
potentially disastrous results. While law-trained people see logic,
dignity, and protection from government oppression in judicial and
judicially-based procedures, others may see an Alice in Wonderland
farrago, where strange creatures speak gibberish, and the presiding
official shouts AGive your evidence . . and don=t be nervous, or I=ll
have you executed on the spot.@ 65 Most significantly, they may not
see protection from government authority but an exercise of that
authority, a situation that Carroll portrayed by having the King, who
presides at Alice=s trial, wear his crown on top of his wig. 66 The
informality of bureaucratic process may make the situation worse, not
better. A feature of Kafka=s law courts that makes them seem
particularly sinister is that they are placed on the top floor of
tenements, insinuating themselves into people=s lives without the
liminal warning that ceremony and formality provides. 67
veterans= benefits in Walters v. National Ass=n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305 (1985), but the opinion is entirely unconvincing.
64
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147 (Martin Gardner, ed., 1960)
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B. Client-Centered Governance: The Management Solution
Management theory, as developed through the disciplines of
sociology and public policy analysis offers an entirely different
solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression. Instead of
imposing externally-generated requirements on government agents,
the management approach attempts to change these agents= internal
attitudes. In particular, the aspiration is to instill an ethos of client
orientation, a prevailing attitude that the people for whom the agency
provides benefits or services are to be treated as clients, or better still,
as customers. According to the Gore Report, an action plan drafted at
the beginning of the first Clinton administration that summarized the
work of a study group called the National Performance Review,
Agovernment agencies must do what many of America=s best
businesses have done: renew their focus on customers.@68 The report,
moreover, documents a number of cases where agencies actually
implemented this approach. 69
Michael Barzelay provides a more systematic account of
client-centered administration.70 The first step, he suggests, is to
identify the customer with care: AA customer relationship is a
mutually adjustive working relationship in which the provider=s main
purpose is to meet the user=s needs.@ 71 One danger to be avoided is
expanding the idea of a customer beyond the boundaries of this
relationship: AThe potential consequences of identifying as customers
the people obligated to comply with norms include misstating the
principal purposes of compliance organizations and dissipating the
conceptual force of the term customer.@ 72 After the customer has
68
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been identified, the agency must decide the particular kind of service
that it should be providing. The best source of information about this
is the customers themselves. While the customers= perceptions are
not necessarily accurate, they should be accepted unless a persuasive
argument can be made for contradicting or ignoring them. Thus,
customer evaluations can be used to assess and readjust agency
procedures. To foster an ethos of customer service, control functions
should be separated from service functions, and assigned to a
different unit of the agency.
A particularly thoughtful and creative assimilation of this
management theory into legal scholarship is described by its
proponents as New Public Governance. One of its primary themes is
that command and control regulation is ineffective, and should be
replaced by a more collaborative approach.73 When applied to
government provision of goods and services, this approach suggests
that those receiving benefits or services from government should be
consulted about both the design and implementation of the program.
In fact, the approach is sufficiently general that it can be applied to an
extremely wide range of government interactions with individuals,
including the treatment of drug offenders. Describing the use of drug
courts to replace the standard criminal sanction, Michael Dorf and
Charles Sabel write: AThe central feature of this governance system is
that the monitored agents choose their own precise goals and the
means for achieving them in return for furnishing a central authority
with the information that allows evaluation of their performance. . ..
[B]y collaborating in this way, central authority and decentralized
actors can together explore and evaluate solutions to complex
problems that neither alone would have been likely to identify, much
less investigate or address, without the exchanges with the others. The
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same exchanges of information, moreover, enable the institutions
continually to adjust their means and ends in the light of experience.@74
Despite the broad support that it engenders, and the
intellectual sophistication of its proponents, client-centered
management suffers from serious limitations as a response to the
problem of bureaucratic oppression. Like policy analysis in general,
its implicit audience is a rational policy maker who exists only in
theory; when attention focuses on real-world actors, the
recommended policy takes on the character of a moral exhortation.
Neither is without its value, to be sure. It is useful to know the
optimal strategy to achieve a given result, that is, the strategy that a
perfectly rational decision maker, unencumbered by political
constraints, would find persuasive. Similarly, exhortations from
scholars often prove to me more influential than might be expected,
particularly over long periods of time. But the problem of
bureaucratic oppression is one that is specifically resistant to either
optimal strategies or moral exhortations. No one is in favor of
bureaucratic oppression, and while some administrators may adopt it
as a conscious approach to deter citizen users and save money, few
could be said to do so justifiably. As described above, the real causes
of bureaucratic oppression are deeply-embedded structural factors:
status differences, stranger relations, institutional pathologies, and
divergent incentives. Thus, the task is to counteract these structural
factors, to reduce or eliminate the impediments that prevent
conscientious policy makers from providing the kind of service that
they know is preferable. Telling them that a client-centered strategy
is the optimal approach, and exhorting them to adopt that strategy,
simply fails to address the real problem.
To explain the mechanism by which his client-centered
approach would be implemented, Barzelay writes: AIn a typical
customer relationship, users believe that providers should be
accountable to them (and perhaps to other parties) for [meeting the
users= needs] and providers recognize that they ought to be so
accountable.@ 75 This makes a good deal of sense, but the term
74
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Aaccountable@ is undefined, and, in fact, it conceals a crucial
ambiguity. 76 It implies that one person is answerable to another, and
must conform his or her behavior to the other=s desires. But the
primary means by which this is achieved, in a modern context, is
through administrative supervision. We often speak of election as
providing accountability, but the connection between being elected by
a group of people and being subject to ongoing, detailed supervision
is rather large, so that the term accountability, as used in this context,
seems to be more metaphorical than operational.77 The main point is
that the users, or Acustomers@ of a government agency are not in a
position to supervise that agency=s officials in any sense, not even the
attenuated sense in which voters supervise elected officials, and
clearly not in the robust sense in which an administrative superior
supervises a subordinate. That is precisely where the problem of
bureaucratic oppression resides. In theory, and on the basis of moral
exhortation, these officials should of course be accountable to the
people whom the legislature has instructed them to serve. But
because of status differences, stranger relations, institutional
pathologies and divergent incentives, they are simply not accountable
in any real sense.
Studies of customer relations in business firms suggest a
further difficulty with client-centered governance. These studies,
engendered by the shift from a manufacturing to a service and
information economy 78 have observed that management efforts to
induce employees to be pleasant, helpful and generally customeroriented often produce routinized, stereotyped behaviors that generate
76
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resentment among employees and provide customers with little more
than empty gestures.79 If this is true in private enterprise, where the
employees are providing services to customers and the crucial choices
generally lie within the customer=s control, it is probably much more
true in government, where the employees are often exercising
authority, and the citizen has few, if any options. Thus, the only
effect of an agency=s efforts to make its employees more customeroriented may be that the now-resentful employees say AGreat to see
you. Have a nice day.@ after having provided the same peremptory
treatment.
New Public Governance provides a partial response to these
difficulties by emphasizing the importance of collaboration with the
customers regarding the agency=s implementation strategy, and
perhaps even its norm or policy formation. This establishes a
dynamic relationship that allows the customers to interact with the
agency on a continuous basis, and thereby become a structural
component of the agency=s behavior pattern that can counteract the
structural features discussed above. For example, if a social service
agency regularly consults with advocacy groups and focus groups of
individual recipients in designing and revising its mode of
distributing benefits, these groups will be part of the agency=s
decision making apparatus. They will thus produce an effect on the
agency without having to rely on the agency=s self-imposed
commitment to be client-oriented. In addition, it avoids relying on
externally-imposed rules that are derived from a judicial model, and
are thus of limited relevance to the day-to-day realities of the
administrative setting.
While New Public Governance thus represents an important
conceptual advance that incorporates insights from management
theory and the sociology of institutions into legal analysis, its
recommendations have significant limitations of their own. To
government officials at the operational level, the demand that they
engage in a collaborative relationship with the beneficiaries of their
program is as external a demand as the imposition of due process
requirements. This is not necessarily fatal, since institutional change
79
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must begin from somewhere. The problem is that the mechanism for
continued implementation of the collaborative approach is attenuated.
It is true that the clients have been incorporated into the decision
making structure. The difficulty is that all the inherent structural
features that generate bureaucratic oppression B status differences,
stranger relations, institutional pathologies and divergent incentives B
will continue to operate. The clients will continue to be seen as low
status individuals; the obligation to consult with them will strike most
officials as a burden and an intrusion; the inclination to follow
procedures, and use those procedures as a means of avoiding difficult
or trying situations will continue; and the officials will still have the
same divergent incentives as before. New Public Governance
represents a real advance, but it depends on a rather sunny view of
public officials, an expectation that they will be more conscientious,
more flexible, and more willing to collaborate with clients than is
actually the case.
C. Market Mechanisms: The Microeconomic Solution
A third way of combating bureaucratic oppression involves
the use of market mechanisms. Based on microeconomic analysis,
this approach is directly addressed to the divergent incentives of
administrative agents, but offers an overall solution through the
assertion, characteristic of this field, that individual incentives are the
decisive factor in determining human and institutional action.
Market mechanisms are thus designed to avoid the defects in the
previously described solutions; they are not externally-imposed rules,
and they do not depend on the good will or conscientiousness of the
administrators. Rather, the idea is to create a situation where people=s
personal self-interest, the source of all human action in
microeconomic analysis, will lead to the elimination of bureaucratic
oppression. In his study of bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson contrasts
the mild but ubiquitous oppression of the long lines and the bored
official behind the metal counter with the cheerful politeness and
efficiency of the nearby McDonalds,80 a cheerfulness that has become
virtually emblematic of the new service society. 81 His explanation
80
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for the difference is that McDonalds is operating in the market, where
self-interest and good service are aligned. 82
The idea of market mechanisms actually consists of two
different approaches to the problem of bureaucratic oppression. The
first approach involves the literal use of these mechanisms, that is,
relying on market mechanisms by diminishing the scope of
regulation, benefits and services that the government provides. The
second is an effort to incorporate market mechanisms into the
operation of administrative government by changing the way that
administrative agencies are structured. These are independent
solutions; they can be readily combined, and often are, since they are
based on the same theory of human action, but they can also be
implemented separately without impairing their effectiveness in any
way.
Diminishing the scope of administrative regulation, benefits
and services is a popular idea these days,83 and has been implemented
in a variety of settings. Most of the true deregulation occurred during
the Carter administration.84 Benefit and service reduction has been
implemented during subsequent years, particularly in the social
welfare area,85 although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between ideologically-based reductions and reductions driven by
budgetary shortages. The consequence, in all these cases, is that an
area previously addressed through a government program is now
being controlled by the market; airline prices are now set by market
competition, not the Civil Aeronautics Bureau, individuals who
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welfare benefits are terminated must now depend on their the market
value of their labor, or their parents= labor, for their sustenance.86
Whatever the general virtues and vices of this approach, it
suffers from some serious defects as a solution to the problem of
bureaucratic oppression. To begin with, it is fragmentary; despite the
fervent dreams of the far right, there is no realistic possibility that the
administrative state will be dismantled. The demands for personal
security, economic security and social justice by citizens of modern
states are simply too insistent, and any government that chose to
ignore these demands would risk rapid dissolution. It is true that
voting majorities in the United States have been willing to scale back
administrative programs providing for economic security, probably
because racial division decrease their sympathy for the poor, but how
willing would these same majorities be, particularly after the World
Trade Center attack, to scale back administrative programs providing
for personal security?
A second problem with replacing administration with the
market is that is does not necessarily reduce the amount of oppression
that individuals experience. As John Kenneth Galbraith observes, the
large firms that dominate the market in many areas are themselves
bureaucracies.87 Wilson responds that they are different kinds of
bureaucracies because private firms are subject to market discipline,
that is, their well-being depends directly on the caliber of goods and
services that they provide.88 The difficulty, however, is that the
bureaucratic nature of the firm may insulate the individuals within the
firm from the feedback mechanisms of the market.89 Like government
officials, their behavior to their customers may be governed by status
differences, stranger relations, institutional pathologies and divergent
incentives. Agency problems of this sort are common in large firms;
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McDonalds employees may be polite to customers who come in to
order a hamburger, but the now-deregulated airline employees may
not be as helpful to the long lines of irate customers on the other side
of their metal counters, despite some vaguely-understood connection
between customer satisfaction and the ultimate economic health of
their employer.90 Moreover, even if employees of private firms are
more polite than government agents in their manner of treating
individual customers, the firm itself may subject these customers to
other types of oppression. The polite McDonalds employees are, after
all, dispensing McDonalds food, which may well be lowering its
customers= long-term life expectancy. Moreover, if McDonalds were
not regulated by public health authorities, its food might lower some
customers= short-term life expectancy. Private firms oppress
individuals by polluting their environment, selling merchandise with
hidden defects, and siphoning large sums off to their executives,
legally and illegally. These firms have no incentive to concern
themselves with any of these problems unless they become public in a
way that affects their bottom line. Just as the World Trade Center
crisis indicates our need for administrative government, the Enron
crisis indicates the dangers to which private, relatively unregulated
firms subject us.
A second, and distinctly different use of market mechanisms
is to alter the incentive structure of administrative agencies, rather
than replacing these agencies with market actors. One means of
doing so is to set up a situation in which government institutions or
programs compete with each other, like private firms, to obtain a
source of income. In school voucher programs, for example, parents
can choose among a variety of public schools, and the school then
receives a fixed amount of public money for each student who
enrolls.91 Another approach, where such competition is impractical, is
90
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to place a single agency on a receipt and expenditure basis, so that its
budget depends on the service it provides. This is only possible for
certain agencies, namely those that can be supported by user fees,
such as highways, mass transit services or recreational facilities; it is
obviously impossible for agencies that distribute benefits such as
welfare or housing. An alternative is to simulate a receipt and
expenditure situation by counting certain agency achievements as an
economic input, or by counting the costs that the agency imposes as
an expense. Robert Litan and William Nordhaus recommend the
creation of a regulatory budget, where each agency would be
allocated a fixed amount of costs that it could impose on private
industry. 92 The Gore Report recommends the creation of one-stop
worker training and retraining centers that would compete with one
another for funding based on the number of people who used each
center, and the results that they achieved. 93
But creating either real or simulated market mechanisms for
public agencies has serious limitations as a means of reducing
bureaucratic oppression.
The establishment of real market
mechanisms constitutes a policy decision that may have serious
detriments; it can distort private behavior, impose economically
regressive costs, and induce the legislature to cut public funding.94
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Bureaucratic oppression, however serious, may not rise to a level that
justifies such a profound reorganization of essential public services.
School vouchers are championed for the more basic reason that they
will improve the intrinsic quality of education, not because the
teachers will treat the students more respectfully, and user fees for
national parks are championed on grounds of social justice, not
because they will make the park rangers more polite. Even if the
problem of bureaucratic oppression is seen to justify profound
changes in public financing, the solution is not necessary directed at
the problem. Many other factors, including ability to pay, contribute
to people=s willingness to incur user fees. Imposing user fees on
recreational facilities may convince poor people to stay home with
their children and watch television, no matter how gracious the park
official have become.
Simulated market mechanisms suffer from the same difficulty
in targeting the specific problem of bureaucratic oppression. In
addition, their use of artificially-determined valuations, or funny
money, makes these programs complicated to administer, and
potentially inaccurate. Real markets provide an enormous amount of
information, largely for free; 95 collecting an equivalent amount of
information, so that the simulated mechanism is sufficiently accurate
to serve its purpose, may lie beyond the capacities of government.
Ultimately, simulated market mechanisms may not be much of an
improvement on the Office of Management and Budget=s cost-benefit
analysis, 96 which is a good deal simpler, and has nonetheless been
subject to extensive criticism.97
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III. Dangerous Clients: The Phenomenological Solution
Bureaucratic oppression remains a ubiquitous problem and,
given its structural origins, an intractable one. The solutions
discussed above B due process, client-centered management and
market mechanisms B are all useful efforts to combat the problem, but
each has its limitations. This section offers a somewhat different
solution based on the ombudsperson concept that has been
implemented in a few places in the United States, and more
extensively in Britain, Canada India, and the European Union. It too
has limitations, but it is directed to the structural issues that generate
bureaucratic oppression, and avoids some of the difficulties of other
solutions. Although it draws on the same disciplines as these
solutions, namely law, public policy, sociology and economics, it is
primarily based on phenomenology, and specifically on the
application of phenomenology to the sociology of individuals and
institutions.
A. The Phenomenology of Danger
The collapse of the Roman Empire during the late fifth
century, or, more specifically, the collapse of the Empire=s ability to
impose civil order ,98 led to a highly decentralized mode of
governance in Western Europe. For about one thousand years,
warrior aristocrats ruled territories of variable size, with a variable,
but always considerable amount of independence. While they were
organized in a clearly defined hierarchy, with the king or emperor at
the top, and knights or castellans who controlled small territories at
the bottom, each of them was considered a noble, or free man, as
opposed to the serfs who farmed his lands. Each, whether he had
several levels of subordinate nobles below him or several levels of
overlords above him, was entitled to defend his rights, and assert
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purported rights against his fellow nobles.99 Because the kings and
emperor were not capable of imposing civil order, this defense and
assertion of one=s rights was often accomplished by violence. 100
The Western world=s concept of manners, and specifically the
respectful treatment of another human being, originated in these
circumstances.101 It is striking how gracious, how genuinely
considerate, one will behave toward another person when that person
can justifiably kill you for acting disrespectfully. This is not merely a
question of fear, although fear obviously plays a role. Fear, or
resentment, is likely to be the dominant reaction to a highwayman or
pirate B also quite common in the medieval era due to the lack of civil
order B who is holding a knife to one=s throat. But a fellow nobleman
is not simply someone who can kill you, but someone who can kill
you justifiably. Thus, his dangerousness is not a violation of the
social order, but an assertion of it, and it is this combination that
confers status and engenders genuine respect. The connection
between dangerousness and status is not based on a microeconomic
explanation of human behavior, but on phenomenology.
Microeconomics, which treats people as self-interest maximizers, can
certainly explain why people would respond to threats of violence
with a wariness that might resemble respect, but it has difficulty
distinguishing between justified or unjustified threats, and cannot
explain why such wariness would be transformed into genuinely
respectful feelings. According to phenomenology, however, people
are primarily motivated by the desire to create meaning for
themselves. Each person stands at the center of a set of subjectively
perceived experiences, and has no access to knowledge that lies
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outside that ambit of experience. 102 Knowledge that lies beyond the
individual=s experience, including social knowledge, must be
transmitted to the person through an intersubjective process.103 In
fact, such knowledge is necessary for all but the most primeval
thoughts, and the world that each individual perceives, though a
matter of personal experience, is an interpreted world, interpreted by
the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes society and culture.104
The individual must then integrate this knowledge with personal
experiences and emotions to create a meaningful totality. 105
Thus, the fear engendered by a dangerous person is combined
with the intersubjective interpretation of that person as justified in
eliciting that fear. This combination of emotion and knowledge is
then given meaning by according the individual respect, or social
status. The sense of respect is generated by each individual=s need to
102
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construct a meaningful account of his or her experience. AWhy am I
fearful of this person, and why does society protect that person=s
ability to elicit that fear, rather than trying to protect me from the
threat?@ The attitudes thus generated are then communicated
intersubjectively. Thus, reactions generated by the individual=s need
to create meaning are then promulgated as social norms, and function
as effective norms because they accord with their recipients= internal
needs. This recursive process, which is phenomenology=s solution to
the macro-micro problem in modern sociology, explains how the
inherent violence of medieval society, and the justification of that
violence that followed from the lack of civil order, were transformed
into components of a functioning social system.
In contrast to medieval society, the modern administrative
state is characterized by high levels of civil order.
The
monopolization of force by the central government that occurred
between the Middle Ages and the present time has suppressed
interpersonal violence, and led to a pacified, orderly and complex
social system.106 But the increasingly complex and interdependent
character of modern society 107 generates a different, if less dramatic
set of dangers. Most people are dependent upon others for their
livelihoods, and thus experience a sense of danger in dealing with
those who are in a position to dismiss them, penalize them or
stigmatize them. These sanctions, moreover, are generally justified
by society=s property rules, either alone or in conjunction with the
institutional rules of private firms, just as violence in response to
insult was justified in medieval society. As a result, the medieval
attitudes that accorded respect to military aristocrats have gradually
evolved into modern attitudes that accord respect to those who can
justifiably impose career-based sanctions. As before, this respect is
not simply an outward display based on a subjectively-experienced
sense of fear, but a genuinely-felt response based on the
phenomenological need to create meaning, and the intersubjective
promulgation of that response throughout society.
It is a sociological commonplace to observe that respect is
based on social status.
Stated in this manner, however, the
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observation is not particularly informative, since the two terms are
often synonymous. A more useful inquiry is to determine the sources
of respect and social status, then to see whether there is any difference
between the two, and whether any of those sources are variables that
are amenable to public policy intervention. The point of the
foregoing discussion is to identify justifiable threat, or danger as a
source of respect that is not equivalent to social status. Fame confers
high social status, and thus generates respect, for non-dangerous
persons; one can admire professional athletes or movie stars without
being afraid of them. Conversely, justified danger can generate
respect for persons who lack the other attributes of social status.
Thus, a possible antidote for bureaucratic oppression is to engender
respect for the low status persons who receive benefits and services
from government agencies is to make them justifiably dangerous to
the officials in the agency.
Norbert Elias= The Civilizing Process, one of the truly great
works of twentieth century social theory, provides further insight into
the mentality of the administrative state, although from a somewhat
different perspective.108
Noting the Western world=s gradual
elimination of interpersonal violence due to the central government=s
monopolization of force, Elias argues that the increasingly irenic
behavior of individuals within this culture can be described as a
civilizing process. It is characterized by the internalization of social
control, a set of personal attitudes, purchased at varying levels of
internal distress depending on the nature of the individual, that
suppress basic human desires for violent self-assertion or
retaliation.109
This control arises from the increasingly
interdependent nature of modern society, the differentiation of tasks
that requires people to Aattune their conduct to that of others.@110
Thus, the less dependent one person is upon another, the less the
person=s livelihood or well-being depends upon that other person, the
108
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less Acivilized@ his behavior is likely to be. This lack of civility will
not be manifested as violence, since the state insists on maintaining
its monopoly of force, but as vindictive, resentful or impolite
behavior.
B. A Dangerousness Proposal
A number of jurisdictions throughout the world have
experimented with the use of ombudspersons. An ombudsperson is a
government official who is authorized to receive complaints about
other officials and to take some sort of action based on those
complaints. Ombudspersons can also initiate investigations of their
own to discover bureaucratic behavior toward individuals of the sort
that might conceivably generate complaints, and then take the same
sort of action. Whether an official who only conducted investigations
of this nature, and did not receive citizen complaints, should be called
an ombudsperson is a definitional nicety that need not be pursued for
purposes of this discussion. It seems fairly clear, however, that the
subject matter of the investigation must be the sort of action that
might generate complaints; if it is misbehavior that does not have a
direct effect on citizens, such as theft of government funds or
disobedience of internal rules, we would tend to describe the
government investigator in other terms.
The idea of an ombudsperson was developed in Scandanavia,
111
and has been recently adopted by the European Union. 112 It has
been used fairly extensively in the English speaking world,
particularly in the United Kingdom, 113 Canada 114 New Zealand, 115 and
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India.116 In the United States, it has generally been used for specific
administrative programs at the federal level, 117 and implemented
comprehensively in several states.118 In the U.K., there are three
separate groups of ombudspersons, one at the national level and
having general jurisdiction, a second at the national level with
jurisdiction over health-related matters, and a third for local
government. Morever, the mechanism has proven so popular that
many government agencies and even private firms have developed
their own ombudspersons.119 In order to complain to the national
ombudspersons, citizens must file their complaints with a member of
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the House of Commons, who then transmits it to the ombudsperson.
This somewhat unusual arrangement makes the mechanism appear to
resemble casework in the U.S., that is, interventions by legislators on
behalf of important constituents. 120 In fact, the legislators in the U.K.
perform a very general screening, or gate keeping function and
transmit most of the complaints to the ombudsperson, rather than
serving as the means of redress. 121 Once the ombudspersons have
received the complaint, they investigate, and can then either advise
the agency or recommend legislation.
Ombudsperson programs are designed to redress a range of
problems regarding the performance of administrative agencies. The
paradigmatic problem that they seem to envision is a substantive one
B the agency has given the individual incorrect information, or
incorrect treatment B rather than the more atmospheric one of
oppressive behavior. This approach leads naturally to the sorts of
advisory or hortatory responses that constitute the remedial repertoire
of the existing programs. If the agency has made an error, all that
seems necessary is to bring that error to the attention of a responsible
official. That is, moreover, all that seems appropriate; there is no
reason to punish the agency for the sorts of mistakes that inevitably
occur in the complex process of administrative implementation. If
systematic errors occur, they would seem to stem from the design of
the authorizing legislation, and are properly addressed by
recommendations to the legislature for the revision of the statute.
Suppose, however, that the ombudsperson mechanism were to
be used to combat bureaucratic oppression. The problem here is not
that its employees have made an error, but that they have engaged in
conscious mistreatment of the individuals whose interests their
agency is supposed to serve. In the most extreme case, they have
improperly terrorized and excoriated someone, as the Very Important
Person did to Akaky Akakyevich. In the more mundane and frequent
case, they have treated someone with insensitivity and disrespect.
120
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The best solution, it would appear, is to engender respect for the
agency=s clients among its employees. If agency officials genuinely
respect the clients, they would not behave like Gogol=s Very
Important Person, or like the bored, surly government clerk behind
the metal counter. They would be gracious and genuinely
considerate, thus eliminating oppression even in cases where they
were required to deny the individual=s request.
One means that might engender such respect is to make the
clients dangerous persons for the employees. This could be achieved
by authorizing the ombudsperson to punish employees when she
received complaints about them. Every client would then represent a
potential threat.
Oppressive behavior might always elicit a
complaint, and a complaint might always lead to punishment.
According to the rational actor, or microeconomic approach to human
behavior, this would make the employee wary of the clients, because
the clients would be capable of taking action that would ultimately
impair the employee=s material self-interest. But according to the
phenomenological approach described above, it would have the more
comprehensive and profound effect of making the employees feel
genuine respect for their justifiably dangerous clients. And in Elias=
related view, it would increase the interdependence of the employees
and their clients, by placing the well-being of the employees within
the clients= partial control.
If the rational actor, or microeconomic motivations were the
only ones involved, then the ombudsperson proposal, in making
clients more dangerous to employees, might represent a significant
degradation of their work environment. This result has in fact been
observed by sociologists of work, in connection with both overt
violence and confrontational behavior by customers.122 But, as
indicated above, the phenomenological impact of danger is often
respect, and such respect then becomes a basis for the creation of
genuinely rewarding interactions. An extensive empirical study of
direct contacts between customers and employees in private firms
found that employees often felt that personal interaction was the most
satisfying part of their job, even when, or especially when, their
122
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success depended upon the customers’ reactions to them.123 This
result varied according to the nature of the firm, and could be
counteracted by the presence of irate and unpleasant customers, but
its presence suggests that the need to please people could generate a
sincere willingness to treat them in a friendly and helpful manner.
To achieve this result, the relevant governmental jurisdiction
would need to create an ombudspersons= office as a separate agency,
completely independent of all other agencies, although not necessarily
of the legislature. The ombudspersons would be authorized to receive
complaints from individuals who believed that they had been treated
poorly or improperly by an administrative official. Phone numbers
and web cites for the ombudspersons would be prominently displayed
in government offices. The ombudspersons could then investigate the
complaint, and might also be authorized to investigate cases of
mistreatment on their own initiative. If they found that oppressive
behavior had occurred, they would have authority to sanction the
offending official. Draconian sanctions, such as immediate dismissal,
or even suspension from work, would be inappropriate except in the
most egregious cases. To begin with, most oppressive behavior,
while objectionable, is less than catastrophic; no one likes to be
treated rudely or unhelpfully, but such treatment very rarely causes
death, as it did in Akaky=s case. 124
Second, officials must be
accorded due process when they are sanctioned, and severe sanctions
require too much process to be readily deployed. Finally, the point is
to change the attitudes of existing officials, not to decimate an
experienced workforce. Thus, the appropriate sanction, in most
cases, would be administrative demerits, who consequence might be
denial of a bonus or a raise at the end of the year. Suspension or
dismissal would result only if the employee accumulated a large
number of demerits. That would indicate a consistent pattern that
was more serious than an occasional lapse, it would establish a record
that would satisfy due process requirements, and it would be imposed
only on the most intractable officials.
This proposal is distinct from existing ombudspersons
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programs because it grants the ombudsperson authority to discipline
administrative officials, quite apart from the authority that exists
within the hierarchy of the officials= own institution. It grants this
authority because its purpose is not to correct errors, or detect
systematic defects in the authorizing statute, but to combat
bureaucratic oppression. By making an agency=s clients dangerous B
by enabling them to initiate a process that can lead to a significant
sanction for the employee B the proposal will engender not only
instrumentally rational wariness on the part of the official, but
phenomenologically experienced respect.
C. The Advantages of Dangerous Clients
Establishing an ombudsperson with authority to impose
sanctions on administrators in response to client complaints is a
structural solution to the problem of bureaucratic oppression. It
speaks directly to the status differences and divergent incentives that
generate such oppression. The instrumentally rational response to
sanctions that microeconomics predicts would be a change in the
incentives of bureaucratic agents when dealing with individual
clients. The meaning-based response predicted by phenomenology
would engender more respectful attitudes toward those clients. The
proposal does not address the issues of stranger relations or
institutional pathology directly, but takes account of them through its
effect on status relations and incentives. The institution=s clients
remain strangers, but the sense of threat that now accompanies them
reduces the extent to which they must rely on familiarity to palliate
the impact of bureaucratic oppression. The institution itself remains
subject to organizational pathologies, but the forces acting on its
employees can counteract these pathologies to some extent. If
market forces can counteract the institutional pathologies of business
firms, as James Q. Wilson asserts, then other forces should be able to
fulfill this same role for administrative agencies.
As a structural solution, the ombudsperson program resolves a
number of the difficulties that afflict other solutions to the problem of
bureaucratic oppression. What distinguishes it from the due process
approach is the informality of the complaint process. Due process
can only be applied to adjudications, or administrative proceedings
that resemble adjudications, because it is essentially a set of rules for
determining whether an implementing agency is correctly applying
pre-established rules to a particular individual. It would not extend to
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being yelled at by a Very Important Person, or being told to stand in
the another long line. But anything can be the subject of a complaint.
In addition, since the purpose of the complaint is merely to provide
information to the ombudsperson, and initiate an investigation,
complaints can take virtually any form, and thus do not require any
legal knowledge, or even any degree of comfort with the legal system.
For the same reason, the ombudsperson can justifiably elicit
complaints B by interviewing clients at random, for example, and
asking them how they were treated.
Once the ombudsperson has investigated the issue, and
decided to sanction a particular official, that official must be given
due process. But this applies to the way the substantive standard is
imposed. The standard itself, the criterion for judging the
administrative agency=s performance, is whether it has engaged in
oppressive treatment of individuals, adjudicatory or otherwise. With
a legally-based due process solution, due process is the substantive
standard itself, that is, the only standard that is being imposed on the
administrative agency is a requirement regarding its adjudicatory
actions, not its general treatment of its clients. The negative aspects
of due process, the possibility that it can become its own mode of
oppression, stems from its role as a substantive standard. This occurs
when the means of controlling bureaucratic oppression becomes an
end in itself. Because the ombudsperson approach is less formal, its
substantive standard can be defined as the problem in its totality,
namely bureaucratic oppression, and thus avoid establishing
intermediate standards that can lead to counterproductive results.
Unlike the idea of client-centered governance, the
ombudsperson proposal avoids any appeal to the good will or the
moral sensibilities of administrators, at any level. Of course, to
initiate any governmental reform, someone needs to show good will,
in this case a willingness to combat bureaucratic oppression. But
since the basic problem resides in the attitudes of administrators,
appeals to their good will are best avoided. The preferable approach
is to design a program that can be instituted by the legislature, the
primary policy maker in each American jurisdiction, and then
functions without further need for rational, public-oriented behavior.
This is what the ombudsperson program does. Once in place, it
operates by applying sanctions to oppressive administrators, changing
their behavior by appealing to their self-interest, and their attitudes
through a phenomenological process that lies beyond their control.
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The program should of course be accompanied by moral exhortation
of its own. It would be bizarre to say to administrators: AYou can just
keep doing what you=ve been doing all along, but you=ll be sorry.@
This sort of super-positivist approach to law as an order backed by
sanctions is what Hart criticized so effectively in The Concept of Law.
125
Any program to combat bureaucratic oppression would be based
on a general condemnation of the practice, an exhortation to
administrators to avoid it, and internal efforts within each agency to
decrease it. But the ombudsperson program would add a forceful
sanction, coming from outside the agency, to alter its existing
practices. The nature of the sanction, moreover, should reinforce the
hortatory aspect of the legislation by changing attitudes, and not
merely behavior.
The ombudsperson approach resembles New Public
Governance because it incorporates the clients of an administrative
agency into the agency=s structure; rather than merely admonishing
administrators to be client-centered, it makes client-centeredness part
of the agency=s incentive structure. It has an advantage over New
Public Governance because it does not require the clients to hold their
own within that administrative structure. In the New Public
Governance approach, clients must possess the skills or the
persistence to ensure that the administrators really pay attention to
them, and respond to their expressed needs and desires. With the
ombudsperson program, clients only need to complain. By doing so,
they will enlist the services of a professional administrator who will
have all the necessary skills. On the other hand, New Public
Governance is preferable because it involves more comprehensive
participation by the clients, and a genuinely collaborative relationship
between them and the agency. Which approach will actually work
better in practice depends on one=s views about the flexibility of
administrators, and their willingness to listen to and learn from their
clients. In all probability, these qualities will vary from agency to
agency, and from time to time. The two approaches are not
inconsistent however, because the ombudsperson approach, although
based on more pessimistic assumptions about bureaucratic attitudes,
is not simply intended to threaten administrators, but to generate an
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internal feeling of respect for clients that is fully consistent with the
genuine collaboration of New Public Governance.
Another way in which the ombudsperson program is
consistent, and indeed supportive of, New Public Governance is that
it provides a means of supervising semi-private entities as well as
public ones. One aspect of New Public Governance is an increased
reliance on private parties to carry out functions previously performed
by public agencies.126 Sometimes this involves the retention of a
private contractor to run a program, like food services, or an
institution, like a prison, as a profit-making activity.127 Sometimes it
involves the assignment of regulatory authority to an existing or
specially-created private organization, as provided by the recent
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.128 In any event, the ombudsperson program can
be used as effectively to monitor the behavior of the employees in
these private entities as it can to monitor the officials of the
government agencies they have replaced. The same complaint,
investigation and sanctioning procedures would apply, and the private
entity could be required to agree to these procedures as a condition of
receiving its contract or authority. To be sure, those who are
particularly sanguine about this mechanism might argue that the
competitive environment in which the private entity exists B the
market in general, or the market for government business in particular
B will render such external discipline unnecessary. In that case, the
ombudsperson would receive few valid complaints, and could be
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eliminated after a period of time. But he familiar agencies problems
that afflict private firms suggest that this is an over-optimistic
scenario, and that an ombudsperson in this setting would have plenty
of business.
Finally, the ombudsperson idea is preferable to market
mechanisms because it is applicable to the entire range of
administrative agencies that interact with individuals. It addresses
the problem of bureaucratic oppression with a program that requires
only the political will to address that particular problem. Market
mechanisms generally demand much more extensive changes in the
administrative apparatus: either the outright abolition of government
programs, or the transition from a centralized, hierarchically ordered
system to one where individual units are granted semi-autonomy and
encouraged to compete against each other. However greatly such
changes appeal to certain people, they are extremely controversial,
and their opponents can point to very serious potential dangers that
they might incur. The effort to combat bureaucratic oppression of
individuals need not, and should not, be used as a strategic device to
secure these more far-reaching changes, particularly when it is not
necessary to do so.
Conclusion
Bureaucratic oppression is a ubiquitous problem, stemming
from inherent features of modern government, but it is not an
inevitable one. Administrative agencies, after all, are human artifacts,
and can be changed to reflect our commitments. What appears to be
lacking thus far is the political will to address the problem, and an
effective strategy for solving it. This article is an attempt to remedy
that second of those lacunae. It proposes that the familiar, but
somewhat underused idea of an ombudsperson could be adapted to
remedy bureaucratic oppression. The adaptation would give the
ombudsperson more sanctioning authority than such officials
currently possess, but the purpose would not be to punish, or even to
deter, but to engender an internalized feeling of respect for the
agency=s clients. Gogol=s Overcoat ends with the ghost of Akaky
Akakyevich returning to terrify the government officials who have
taken such an oppressive, imperious attitude toward those whom they
are theoretically supposed to serve. The purpose of this proposal,
however, is not to induce similar feelings of terror, but to alter the
structure of administrative agencies so that the employees see their
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clients as neither ghosts nor verminous intrusions, but as human
beings.
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